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Since 1970, pollution control in the United States has centered
on national level regulatory approaches built on federal com-
mand-and-control regimes. Enacted in reaction to well-publi-
cized "failures" of markets, common law, and state and local
regulation such as the "killer smogs" of the 1950s and 1960s' and
the "burning" of Cleveland's Cuyahoga River in 1969,2 modem
environmental statutes shifted authority away from states, local
governments, and private property holders to the national
government.
Nationalization has its costs, however. In particular, the top
down approach risks transforming the goal of environmental reg-
ulation from the laudable one of protecting and enhancing envi-
ronmental quality to the less laudable one of special interest
rent-seeking. Centralized decision making lowers the cost of cap-
turing agencies (there is only one to capture) while increasing the
benefits (capturing one is capturing all). Shifting decisions to the
national level, therefore, increases the incentives for capture un-
less institutional safeguards are added. Recent water quality reg-
ulatory initiatives by the federal Environmental Protection
Agency threaten to transform water pollution control and make
rent-seeking more prominent.
Air pollution controls have been especially subject to rent
seeking rules that have retarded progress and increased the cost
of pollution controls implemented, all to the benefit of special
interests. 3 On the other hand, water quality pollution control reg-
1. See Andrew P. Morriss, The Politics of the Clean Air Act, in POLITICAL EN-
VIRONMENTALISM 263, 279-92 (Terry L. Anderson, ed., 2000) (describing adoption of
Clean Air Act).
2. See Roger E. Meiners, Stacie Thomas, & Bruce Yandle, Burning Rivers, Com-
mon Law, & Institutional Choice for Water Quality, in THE COMMON LAW AND TiE
ENVIRONMENT 54, 59-63 (Roger E. Meiners & Andrew P. Morriss, eds. 2000)
(describing role of the Cuyahoga fire in the adoption of the 1972 Federal Water
Pollution Control Act Amendments.)
3. See BRUCE A. ACKERMAN AND WILLIAM T. HASSLER, CLEAN COAL/DIRTY
AIR (1981) (outlining alliance of "dirty" Eastern coal producers and environmental
pressure groups against Western low sulphur coal producers); ROBERT CRANDALL,
ET.AL., REGULATING THE AUTOMOBILE (1986) (outlining auto manufacturers' rent-
seeking); Robert Quinn & Bruce Yandle, Expenditures on Air Pollution Control
[Vol. 20:25
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ulations have been relatively immune from rent-seeking because
their decentralized implementation prevented polluting special
interests from using national level regulations to override local
interests in clean water. At the same time, competition among
states and localities has limited local special interests' ability to
gain concessions from state governments. Recent "reforms" of
EPA's water quality program, however, threaten the delicate bal-
ance that has produced water quality improvements. 4 We argue
that water quality is better improved by further decentralizing
water pollution control efforts rather than by increasing centrali-
zation. Because EPA's recent regulatory changes move water
pollution control in precisely the opposite direction, we contend
that they should be significantly modified or abandoned.
Section I reviews the history of federal and state regulation of
water quality and highlights the delicate balance of authority that
has emerged between various levels of government. Section II
examines why federalism is particularly important in water qual-
ity efforts. Section III summarizes the EPA's recent water quality
regulatory initiatives. Section IV offers alternatives to EPA's ap-
proach, emphasizing common law and property rights solutions
to continuing water quality problems.
I.
EVOLVING FEDERALISM IN WATER
QUALrrY REGULATION
Water pollution regulation in the United States has long been a
matter for a federal-state partnership. The modern Clean Water
Act largely relies on a "command-and-control" approach to lim-
iting the discharge of effluent in waters through permits. Due to
differences in implementation, the top-down command lines in
water pollution control have been less clear than in other areas
of pollution control.5 These differences emerged because al-
Under Federal Regulation, 16 Rnv. REG. STUD. 11 (1986) (examining rent seeking
under Clean Air Act).
4. See Revisions to the Water Quality Planning and Management Regulation and
Revisions to the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System Program in Sup-
port of Revisions to the Water Quality Planning and Management Regulation, 65
Fed. Reg. 43,586 (July 13, 2000) (to be codified at 140 C.F.R. pt. 9, 122, 129, 130)
[hereinafter Final TMDL Regulations].
5. See Robert W. Adler, Integrated Approaches to Water Pollution: Lessons from
the Clean Air Act, 23 HARv. ENV'TL. L. Rlv. 203, 206-07 (1999) (arguing that
CWA and TMDL provisions "bear striking similarities" to the CAA but that "imple-
mentation of the statutes has differed significantly" with less uniformity under the
CWA).
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though the Clean Water Act gives the federal EPA authority
over technology-based standards, it also gives the states authority
over the issuance of permits. 6 The degree of federal control over
state permit programs, an issue that has generated substantial lit-
igation over the years,7 has remained unclear.8
Although early federal water pollution control measures re-
quired states to take some minor specific actions, such as
designating water bodies as suitable for recreation, propagation
of aquatic life or other specific classifications, the first major fed-
eral legislation on the subject, the Water Quality Act of 1965, left
water quality issues primarily to the states.9 The centralizing era
of federal water pollution control efforts did not begin until Con-
gress passed the Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amend-
ments, commonly known as Clean Water Act ("CWA"), in
1972.10 Although the CWA required that its goal of enhancing
and protecting the quality of the nation's waters be achieved
while respecting the authority of the states to regulate the use of
6. As of 1996, 40 states had been authorized by EPA to issue NPDES permits. In
the other 10 states, the EPA issues the permits. See GENERAL AccoUNTING OFFICE,
WATER POLLUTION: DIFFERENCES AMONG THE STATES IN ISSUING PERMITs LIMrr-
ING THE DISCHARGE OF POLLUTANTS RCED 96-42 (1996). Since the Clean Water
Act gives the states the primary responsibility for water quality programs, what are
the limits on EPA's ability to reject state plans? A large body of regulatory law has
arisen around the permit process; and the EPA and the states have engaged in nu-
merous informal and formal tussles over the years. See, e.g., WILLIAM H. RODGERS,
JR., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 366-74 (2d ed. 1994) (reviewing disputes).
7. See RODGERS, supra note 6, at 366-74.
8. See Oliver A. Houck, TMDLs, Are We There Yet?: The Long Road Toward
Water Quality-Based Regulation Under the Clean Water Act, 27 ENVTL. L. REP.
10391, 10391 (1997) ("The central tension of the Clean Water Act ("CWA") has
always been between state programs based on local water conditions and a federal
program based on national standards.").
9. The Water Quality Act did direct states to develop water quality standards that
set water quality goals for interstate waters. In most other areas, however, it left
quality issues to the states. See ROBERT ADLER, ET AL. THE CLEAN WATER Acr, 20
YEARS LATER 6-7 (1993); Oliver A. Houck, TMDLs: The Resurrection of Water
Quality Standards-Based Regulation Under the Clean Water Act, 27 EvTiL. L. REP.
10329, 10329 (1997) ("Originally predicated on state programs to achieve water
quality standards, the [CWA] was overhauled in 1972 to require technology stan-
dards for point source dischargers, an approach that would go on to revolutionize
environmental law.").
10. 33 U.S.C. § 1251 (2001).
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their own waters,' the Clean Water Act brought an increased
federal role to the partnership.12
The CWA broadened state requirements for establishing water
quality standards ("WQSs") and directed the newly created fed-
eral Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") to develop and
publish, in "consultation with appropriate Federal and State
agencies and other interested persons,... criteria for water qual-
ity accurately reflecting the latest scientific knowledge" on a wide
range of subjects.13 Based on these numerical water quality "cri-
teria," the CWA then required states to develop WQSs that ap-
ply to interstate waters and submit them to the Administrator of
the EPA.' 4 The Administrator reviewed states' WQSs to ensure
that the states' WQSs were not inconsistent with the require-
ments set by the federal statute.' 5 (If states fail to submit proper
standards, the Administrator may impose a WQS.)16
The CWA structure thus significantly increased the federal
role in determining water pollution policy by providing the fed-
eral government with broad authority to require state govern-
ments to act in accordance with federally established criteria.
Nonetheless, the significant discretion provided to states "indi-
cates the Congress intended that states rather than the federal
government should make most basic decisions about water policy
11. Id. § 1251(a) states the objective of the act to "restore and maintain the chem-
ical, physical, and biological integrity of the Nation's waters." 33 U.S.C. § 1251(b)
further declares: "It is the policy of the Congress to recognize, preserve, and protect
the primary responsibilities and rights of States to prevent, reduce, and eliminate
pollution, to plan the development and use (including restoration, preservation, and
enhancement) of land and water resources, and to consult with the Administrator in
the exercise of his authority under this Act."
12. Some states resisted the nationalization of water pollution regulation, arguing
vigorously (and successfully in the House) against a national approach. See Houck,
Resurrection, supra note 9, at 10332-35 (summarizing governors' and others' roles in
the debate over the 1972 amendments.)
13. 33 U.S.C. § 1314(a)(1). The act requires WQS to consider the impacts "(A) on
the kind and extent of all identifiable effects on health and welfare including, but not
limited to, plankton, fish, shellfish, wildlife, plant life, shorelines, beaches, esthetics,
and recreation which may be expected from the presence of pollutants in any body
of water, including ground water; (B) on the concentration and dispersal of pollu-
tants, or their. byproducts, through biological, physical, and chemical processes; and
(C) on the effects of pollutants on biological community diversity, productivity, and
stability, including information on the factors affecting rates of eutrophication and
rates of organic and inorganic sedimentation for varying types of receiving waters."
33 U.S.C. § 1314(a)(1) (2001).
14. States are to review their water quality standards once each three-year period.
See 33 U.S.C. § 1313(c)(1) (2001).
15. 33 U.S.C. § 1313(c).
16. 33 U.S.C. § 1313(c)(3).
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and related land uses."'1 7 Indeed, until recently, EPA afforded
"states considerable latitude ... to set WQSs that differ from
EPA's own recommendations, or from those established by other
states. Thus, from a national perspective, the system of ambient
standards established under the CWA is characterized by consid-
erable variation among states, even those in the same geographic
region with similar or identical environmental conditions, and
even those that share a single, interstate water body."'18
Although these WQSs constitute a major portion of the na-
tion's water pollution control system, they have been imple-
mented largely through a permit program, the National Pollutant
Discharge Elimination System ("NPDES"). The NPDES restricts
the entry of pollutants into state waters by requiring point-source
polluters to obtain permits from the states.19 The permits specify
which pollutants, and how much of each pollutant, may be emit-
ted from sewage treatment plants, factories, or other pollution
sources into specific bodies of water.20
States have significant discretion in designing these permit pro-
grams.2' While the federal government designs the technology
standards for particular effluents, it is the states that actually is-
sue the permits. The states thus are the decision-makers that
choose the specific limits included in each permit. The permit
programs are large - over 350,000 permits have been issued and
the number is growing rapidly.22 Because of this large volume,
federal oversight of state decision making is necessarily limited as
a matter of practice - EPA simply lacks the resources to conduct
a thorough review of each permit decision.Z3
The technology-based point source regulation of the NPDES
permits is supplemented by water-quality-based regulation. The
CWA requires states to identify water bodies in which the
NPDES permits are not sufficient to achieve water quality stan-
17. Adler, Integrated Approaches, supra note 5, at 210.
18. Id. at 213.
19. See generally, RODGERS, supra note 6, at 361-363 (describing NPDES system).
20. See 33 U.S.C. § 1342 (2001).
21. See 118 CONG. REc. 33,761 (1972) (State permits are issued "under State law
[and] would be State, not Federal, actions ....") (statement of Rep. Wright).
22. There are over 65,000 CWA permits to discharge, most of which require reis-
suing every five years. See ADLER, CLEAN WATER AcT, supra note 9, at 137. In
addition, thousands of dischargers were not brought into the permit process for de-
cades. See id. at 151. Permit backlogs have been a "serious problem" for EPA. Id. at
158.
23. See ADLER, CLEAN WATER Acr, supra note 9, at 254-57 (detailing need for
more resources for CWA implementation).
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dards and to establish a priority ranking, which considers the se-
verity of the pollution and the designated use of the water.24 As
part of this process, states must establish the "total maximum
daily load," or TMDL, for specified pollutants.25 TSMDLs specify
the amount of particular pollutants allowable in a particular
waterbody and allocate the pollutant load to sources.26 Until
EPA's recent regulatory initiatives, the TMDL process did not
have a major impact on state water quality decisions.27 Indeed,
the TMDL process and water quality sections of the CWA were
"virtually ignored by the states and the federal Environmental
Protection Agency." a Note that this does not mean that the
states ignored water quality issues, merely that they did not ad-
dress them through the CWA mechanism.
The states' role in the federal/state partnership yielded a form
of environmental command-and-control regulation with far more
flexibility than found in the comparable air pollution statutes.2 9
24. See 33 U.S.C. § 1313(d)(1)(A) (2001).
25. Id. § 1313(d)(1)(C). Section 1313(d)(1)(C) requires each state to establish, in
accordance with the priority ranking, the total maximum daily load for pollutants
the EPA has identified as suitable for calculations. "Such load shall be established at
a level necessary to implement the applicable water quality standards with seasonal
variations and a margin of safety which takes into account any lack of knowledge
concerning the relationship between effluent limitations and water quality." Id.
26. Final TMDL Regulations, supra note 4, at 43,588.
27. See, e.g., Michael P. Healy, Still Dirty After Twenty-Five Years: Water Quality
Standard Enforcement and the Availability of Citizen Suits, 24 EcoL. L. Q. 393, 414-
25 (1997) (arguing permit based enforcement of WQS failed).
28. Melissa Thorme, Clean Water Act Section 305 (B): A Potential Vehicle for In-
corporating Economics Into the "TMDL" and Water Quality Standards - Setting
Process, 13 TuL. ENvr. L.J. 71,72 (1999); see also Daniel V. Hyde, Are TMDLs the
Answer for Cleaning the Nation's Waters?, 23 L.A. LAW. 15, 16 (Mar. 2000) (describ-
ing TMDL and § 303(d) as a "previously ignored section" of the Clean Water Act);
Jim Boyd, Unleashing the Clean Water Act, RESOURCES 7 (Spring 2000) (TMDL
provision "largely dormant" before EPA proposals.); Houck, Resurrection, supra
note 9, at 10329 ("Water quality standards... lay buried in the books, largely forgot-
ten, taken for dead.") EPA's inattention was understandable, given the greater pri-
ority Congressional leaders put on the technology standards; Houck, Resurrection,
supra note 9, at 10337-38 (quoting Senator Muskie that EPA should "assign secon-
dary priority" to the TMDL provisions and a Senate staff member that "[w]e didn't
take it seriously and thought it would be foolish for EPA to waste time and money to
implement it.")
29. Compare regulatory regimes description in A. Myrick Freeman III, Water
Pollution Policy, in PUBLIc POLICIES FOR ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION 169, 175
(Paul R. Portney & Robert N. Stavins eds., 1990) (1972 amendments "retain[ed] the
system of state-established standards for instream water quality that was enacted in
1965"); Paul R. Portney, Air Pollution Policy, in PUBLIC POLICIES FOR ENVIRON-
MENTAL PROTECTION 77, 80-82 (Paul R. Portney & Robert N. Stavins ed., 1990)
(describing federally determined ambient air quality standards to apply nationally
under CAA).
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Just as with air pollution control, the EPA sets effluent guidelines
on a point-source basis for each major U.S. industry. And just as
with air pollution, to obtain an operating permit, industrial oper-
ators must demonstrate that satisfactory pollution control ma-
chinery will be in place and operating.30 With EPA approval,
state pollution control agencies are given delegated authority to
issue permits, monitor and enforce outcomes for both air and
water pollution.31
Unlike the air pollution statute, however, the CWA does not
set national ambient water quality standards to be met in each
body of water across the nation.32 States classify the streams in
their jurisdictions, and neither the classification schemes nor the
criteria used are uniform across states.33 As a result, compared
with the air pollution control regime, it has been costly, if not
impossible, for an industry to obtain a uniform regulatory out-
come by plying the halls of EPA and Congress. Uniform national
command-and-control regulation of the sort employed for air
quality, and until now avoided by water quality regulation, en-
ables polluting industries to cartelize within a regulatory regime.
Typically, the regulation requires a reduction in output, and so
regulators limit entry by imposing regulatory barriers to entry in
the form of increased costs. This effect is confirmed both by the-
ory and empirical evidence. The possibility that national regula-
30. See RODGERS, supra note 6, at 362-63.
31. See id. (describing state role under CWA); See also Morriss, Clean Air Act,
supra note 1, at 270-76 (describing state role under CAA).
32. See Adler, Integrated Approaches, supra note 5, at 251-52. Professor Adler
notes that:
A key distinction between the two types of criteria and standards, however, is the
manner in which and uniformity with which they are established. By statute, WQS
are adopted primarily by individual states based on EPA guidance and subject to
EPA review and approval, and therefore vary widely given the significant latitude
EPA has shown the sates in the approval process. Moreover, no uniform rules
govern the methods and procedures by which compliance with these disparate
WQS must be determined, or even the rules that dictate when a violation of the
WQS is triggered. By contrast, a single set of NAAQS adopted by EPA apply
uniformly throughout the country. Moreover, the NAAQS are accompanied by a
uniform set of procedures for monitoring and assessment, and fixed rules for deter-
mining when the standards are met and when they are violated. While the CAA
system of monitoring and attainment designation is vulnerable to considerable ma-
nipulation, it is likely that much more parity exists under the CAA than under the
CWA, where the system is designed to vary greatly.
33. See id. at 253 ("In contrast, under the CWA system, states may choose widely
divergent water quality standards based on different economic and political judg-
ments, which results in substantial differences in control obligations that are unre-
lated to actual differences in water quality.").
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tion could yield cartel profits was first described in theoretical
terms by Nobel economics laureate James Buchanan and Prof.
Gordon Tullock.34 Empirical analysis found evidence of profita-
ble regulatory cartels in air pollution.3 5 Significantly, similar at-
tempts to identify cartel-derived profits in water pollution
control were not successful.36
This statute-derived location flexibility for water quality issues
yielded a competitive playing field where water-using industries
sought lower cost sites and states sought to employ lower cost
ways to achieve environmental goals. The result was a "race to
top" in water quality produced by the decentralized (at least rela-
tive to air quality regulation) competitive environment.
EPA's changes in water quality regulations eliminate impor-
tant cost-reducing competitive forces present in federal water
pollution control since 1972. Under the new regime, EPA is the
gatekeeper for entry and expansion of industries nationwide. A
sense of the scope of change can be seen in EPA's own estimate
that 40,000 TMDLs will have to be set in the coming years,
"each of which will result in more stringent controls on all
sources of pollutants. '37 Political-favor seeking is heightened as
firms seek to gain competitive advantages by means of uniform
federal regulation. As a result, both water quality and economic
efficiency are likely to suffer.
This is not to suggest that the prior regime was optimal. Far
from it - the old rules created numerous perverse incentives for
both states and EPA. For example, the pre-water-quality-reform
Clean Water Act regulatory regime had not addressed the real
problems that arose from the failure of the EPA and the states to
address nonpoint source water pollution. Most states did not as-
sess their watersheds because the costs are significant and, quite
likely, because the consequences of an honest assessment that
reveals pollution problems could have been expensive EPA man-
dates.38 On the other hand, to be eligible for certain federal
34. See James M. Buchanan & Gordon Tillock, Polluters' "Profit" and Political
Response, 65 AM. ECON. Rnv. 139 (1975).
35. See M.T. Maloney & Robert E. McCormick, A Positive Theory of Environ-
mental Quality, 25 J.L. & ECON. 99 (1982).
36. See Myles Wallace, Sharon Watson, & Bruce Yandle, Environmental Regula-
tion: A Financial Markets Test, 28 Q. Rav. ECON. & Bus. 67 (1988).
37. Thorme, supra note 28, at 72.
38. See generally Michael P. Healy, Still Dirty After Twenty-Five Years: Water
Quality Standard Enforcement and the Availability of Citizen Suits, 24 ECOLOGY
L.Q. 393, 395 (1997).
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money, the states had to declare bodies of water to be impaired.
As the governor of Wyoming explained to Congress, "the author-
ity for states to receive federal money for watershed work re-
quired that we declare that a waterbody was functionally
impaired-regardless of its actual condition. That misunderstood
incentive caused many streams to be mislabeled as impaired. ''39
In sum, the primary means of controlling water pollution has
been the combination of national technology-based standards for
particular effluents and state-issued permits for release of speci-
fied pollutants. The lack of clear federal primacy in this system
has provided states with significant policy space to address water
quality issues themselves.40 Most importantly, the federalist ap-
proach to water quality regulation prevented larger water users
from using the regulatory process to cartelize their industries. In
addition to this negative reason to prefer a federalist approach,
there are also positive reasons to allow federalism in water qual-
ity regulation. We turn to these in the next section.
II.
THE NEED FOR FEDERALISM IN WATER
POLLUTION CONTROL
A division of authority amongst competing jurisdictions is sug-
gested by the nature of water quality issues. Although there are
significant interconnections among waterways, many water qual-
ity issues affect only particular bodies of water or portions of
bodies of water. Mandating the same solution to water quality
issues for the Gallatin River in Montana and the Cuyahoga River
in Ohio serves no obvious purpose. The rivers differ hydrologi-
cally and the surrounding regions differ demographically and ec-
39. Hearing on Governors' Perspectives on the Clean Water Act Before the Sub-
committee on Water Resources and the Environment of the House Committee on
Transportation and Infrastructure, 106 CONG. REc. 4 (1999) (statement of Gov. Ger-
inger). The new rules compound this problem, as the states know they may face
costs that cannot be predicted given the open-ended nature of the authority EPA is
asserting under the rules.
40. Just as there is diversity among the states in their water needs and water
problems, the science of water pollution control is still emerging, and will continue
to evolve more rapidly if the states are allowed to take different approaches to water
quality management. The new TMDL rules produce great uncertainty among the
states and will cause them to look constantly to EPA for the agency's currently pre-
ferred water pollution control measures. States will have less incentive to find inno-
vative solutions to water problems if they all have the same point of reference (the
federal authority), especially if the EPA can reject any part of any state's proposed
water plan and impose its own standards and solutions.
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onomically. Since bodies of water are rarely "national" in scope,
the intuition is that water quality issues are also not national in
scope.
Before assessing the case for federalism in water quality regu-
lation, we should address the arguments of the strongest propo-
nent of a national approach. William F. Pedersen, Jr., a former
EPA official in the 1970s, is a careful and thoughtful analyst of
environmental statutes.41 In a 1988 article Pedersen set out an
argument for a program strikingly similar to EPA's current
TMDL initiative.42 While we have obvious differences with Pe-
tersen's analysis,43 this is the strongest case for a national ap-
proach we have encountered. Although Pedersen is sensitive to
economic efficiency arguments, and uses them to buttress his cri-
tique of the current approach to water pollution control,44 he re-
lies heavily on a textbook approach to the economic issues,
equating economic efficiency with getting marginal costs equal
across industries rather than examining dynamic issues pertain-
ing to innovation or public choice issues concerning regulators'
behavior.45
What is most striking about Pedersen's analysis, however, is
the enormous degree of centralization it entails. For example,
after making a marginal-cost-based argument for shifting away
from technology-based standards to a water-quality-based ap-
proach, Pedersen argues that an advantage of giving EPA water-
quality-based authority over the states is that it would allow effi-
ciency-enhancing "bubble" trades among pollution sources.46
Regulators should be able to "determine [water] uses freely" and
then EPA would "hold" states to their choices. 47 Further, a
"much more potent cure, one that past experience suggests is
41. See, e.g., William F. Pedersen, Jr., Why the Clean Air Act Works Badly, 129 U.
PA. L. REv. 1059 (1981).
42. William Pedersen, Jr., Turning the Tide on Water Quality, 15 ECOLOGY L.Q.
69 (1988).
43. Where we see evolved federalism that allows states room to experiment, for
example, Pedersen sees congressional avoidance of politically difficult choices. Id. at
72-73 (describing CWA and subsequent amendments as "carefully designed" to
avoid "philosophically and politically sensitive issues").
44. See, e.g., id. at 83-84 (describing inefficiencies that result from imposing con-
trol strategies with different marginal costs).
45. But see id. at 87 (acknowledging a public-choice-like issue concerning the ten-
dency of technology-based standards to create a lobbying constituency to press for
relaxation of standards).
46. Id. at 96.
47. Id.
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necessary for effective results, would be to grant EPA the power
to promulgate measures to cure any deficiencies in a state attain-
ment plan."'48
This brief review of Pederson's argument shows the conse-
quences of an EPA-directed national water quality program. In-
evitably such a program entails national control, usurping state
controls - reducing the states to brokers implementing deals to
save costs under EPA-mandated controls. Such a vision rests on
a view of the states as incapable of advancing water quality with-
out EPA's "big stick" pushing them forward.'Such an approach is
inconsistent with the CWA's mandate for federalism and with the
need for water quality.
Professors Henry Butler and Jonathan Macey developed a
"Matching Principle" to analyze federalism issues in environmen-
tal protection that can assist in determining if federalism pro-
motes water quality. "The Matching Principle suggests that, in
general, the size of the geographic area affected by a specific pol-
lution source should determine the appropriate governmental
level for responding to the pollution. '49 Butler and Macey's
Matching Principle provides a framework for considering the
need for federalism in water quality regulation.
Butler and Macey argue that jurisdictional competition is
likely to generate optimal laws if four conditions are fulfilled:
(1) the economic entities affected by the law must be able to
move to alternative jurisdictions at a relatively low cost; (2) all of
the consequences of one jurisdiction's laws must be felt within that
jurisdiction; (3) lawmakers must be forced to respond to adverse
events such as falling population, real estate prices, market share
or revenue, and other manifestations of voter discontent that result
from inefficient regulations; and (4) jurisdictions must be able to
select any set of laws they desire.50
These "federalism conditions" are then combined with a set of
conditions that others argue potentially cut in favor of national
level regulation: limiting interstate externalities; halting a "race
to the bottom;" controlling political cost externalization; captur-
48. Id.
49. Henry N. Butler & Jonathan R. Macey, Externalities and the Matching Princi-
ple: The Case for Reallocating Environmental Regulatory Authority, 14 YALE J. o N
REo. 23, 25 (1996).
50. Id. at 31-32. As the authors note, of course, all these conditions are unlikely to
be perfectly met in the real world. "[Flailure to achieve all four conditions is not a
mandate for federal government intervention, but rather merely an indication that
local regulation may be imperfect." Id. at 32.
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ing national economies of scale in administration, technical ex-
pertise, and funding; and maintaining national moral ideals.5'
Analyzing a particular pollution control problem using these two
sets of conditions can thus clarify the optimal level of govern-
ment to address the problem.
In the case of water quality, the federalism conditions are
largely met. The first federalism condition, that economic entities
have choices, is satisfied for water quality. Users of water,
whether for waste discharge or as an input, have a choice among
locations. While short term shifts in location are problematic for
companies with large site-specific capital investments, in the long
run even these users can alter their behavior in response to gov-
ernment activity. For example, faced with stringent water quality
regulations, a firm could build a treatment plant that transforms
the waste discharged into a river into solid waste for landfill dis-
posal or airborne waste through incineration. A firm might also
restructure its production processes to produce less waste. Other
water users can simply relocate to jurisdictions with more
favorable regulatory regimes.
The second federalism condition, which requires consequences
to be felt within a jurisdiction, is also largely satisfied. Many
water bodies lie entirely within one state. Even where they do
not, many water quality issues are primarily local in nature, since
moving water dilutes discharges. Thus downstream users in an-
other state may be affected by discharges to rivers, but they are
likely to be affected less than local users of the river, who receive
a more concentrated dose of any harmful discharge. Of course
exceptions to this exist. But even in the case of bodies of water
that touch many states (e.g., the Mississippi River), the resulting
problems are not national but regional in scope.
The third federalism condition is largely met within the United
States. State legislatures and executives are politically accounta-
ble, and many water quality issues and related economic issues
are high visibility political issues. Finally, the fourth federalism
condition, an open set of possible laws for the various political
entities, is partially met through the evolved federalism we de-
scribed above. Since federalism for water quality may work, we
must now turn to whether there are competing considerations
that suggest national regulation is superior.
51. Id. at 42-53.
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One strong argument against federalism in some instances is
that states can shift costs to their neighbors. In locating a sewage
treatment plant, for example, a state could build it on the river
just upstream from a state boundary.52 In such circumstances, a
federal role may exist to prevent externalization of costs. Resolv-
ing such matters need not, however, be based on a regulatory
solution. As Butler and Macey point out, "[t]he most effective
way for the federal government to discharge its responsibility to
facilitate the operation of the federal system would be to assign
ownership rights in water to individual states. In this way, states
through which polluted water passed could assert a cause of ac-
tion against the states responsible for the pollution. ' '53
The second potential counter-argument is that national action
is necessary to prevent a "race to the bottom" in which states
compete by lowering environmental quality (and hence costs) to
lure industry to their states. There is considerable doubt that the
''race to the bottom" is the correct description of competition
among states - Prof. Richard Revesz has shown that a "race to
the top" is more likely in many instances.54 Even if a race to the
bottom is possible, however, there are also serious questions
about whether a national solution is appropriate or plausible.55
Setting aside these doubts for the sake of argument, let us con-
sider whether a "race to the bottom" is likely in water quality.
The "race to the bottom" depends on the existence of a politi-
cal market failure at the state level: states choose individually ra-
tional courses of action (lower environmental standards) that
prove to be collectively irrational. As Butler and Macey note,
this depends on the assumption that all localities assess the issue
in the same way, ignoring differences in preferences for environ-
52. Of course, the possibility of a federal role does not mean that the federal
agency will actually act to prevent such harms. See, e.g., Arkansas v. Oklahoma, 503
U.S. 91 (1992) (allowing EPA to issue NPDES permit to a sewage treatment plant in
Arkansas that would emit pollutants that would travel downstream to Oklahoma.)
The existence of a regulatory scheme may, therefore, help to divert the federal
courts from their traditional roles in forcing states to respect each others' claims to
water, substituting the agency as the ultimate decider of water quality for all states.
53. Butler & Macey, supra note 49, at 61.
54. See Richard L. Revesz, Rehabilitating Interstate Competition: Rethinking the
"Race-to-the-Bottom" Rationale for Federal Environmental Regulation, 67 N.Y.U.L.
REv. 1210 (1992). See also ALEXANDER VOLOKH, ET. AL., RACE TO THE Top: THE
INNOVATIVE FACE OF STATE ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT (1998).
55. See Butler & Macey, supra note 49, at 43-45 (arguing federal solution to race
to the bottom is implausible).
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mental quality.56 It is possible that the variance in water quality
may be higher in a federal solution than in a national one, but it
is not at all clear that an overall average water quality will be
lower. Moreover, because water quality issues concern specific
bodies of water that affect discrete states, the race to the bottom
rationale is less plausible than it might be with respect to emis-
sions into a larger commons, such as the atmosphere.5 7 At the
very least, there are serious reasons to be skeptical about the ex-
istence of a race to the bottom in water quality without more
evidence to support the claim.
The third factor favoring national level action is the existence
of political cost externalization. California, for example, is able to
shift some of the cost of its air pollution regime to out-of-state
automobile manufacturers, who cannot pass all the cost on to
California consumers.58 Again, a political market failure is used
to justify national action.59 As Butler and Macey note, however,
even if such behavior occurs, it is not clear that it justifies a pre-
emptive federal solution.60 Again, we must be skeptical that such
a political market failure exists until it. is supported by more than
speculation.
There may also be economies of scale in administration of reg-
ulatory programs, technical expertise, or funding for pollution
control.61 If so, then national regulation should be able to accom-
plish a given regulatory goal at a lower cost. Yet bodies of water
are unlikely to experience such economies of scale because they
are not uniform across the country. Rivers in the arid west are
fundamentally different from those in the more humid regions
east of the Mississippi, for example. Water quality depends, to a
great extent, on local knowledge about the affected body of
water. Further, there are countervailing diseconomies of scale
that must be considered as well.62
Finally, some have argued that federal regulation is justified
because "the federal government is the level of government best
suited to reflect the moral obligation of United States citizens to
56. Id. at 43-44.
57. Id. at 43, n.38 (noting tendency to conflate commons problems and races to
the bottom by commentators.)
58. Id at 46.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 46-47.
61. Id. at 48.
62. Id. at 49.
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one another as well as to future generations. ' ' 63 Although there
may be moral arguments with regard to some environmental
objectives (species preservation), it is not clear that these argu-
ments are only in the direction of national control.64 Moreover,
these arguments seem particularly weak with respect to water
quality. It is hard to know what the moral obligation of Ameri-
cans generally with respect to the Gallatin River is, given that
most Americans have no idea where the Gallatin River is or
what the tradeoffs are concerning water quality. It seems far
more likely that levels of government closer to the body of water
in question could express the moral obligations of those con-
cerned with particular bodies of water.65
None of the countervailing considerations appear to be strong
enough in the case of water quality to allow departure from the
federalism conditions' presumption that environmental regula-
tion should be aligned with the jurisdiction that most closely
matches the relevant problem's boundaries. The Matching Princi-
ple thus suggests that local, state, or regional solutions to water
quality problems are generally preferable to national solutions.
The division of authority between EPA and the states prior to the
recent changes was consistent with the Matching Principle. How
has EPA altered this distribution of authority? We turn to this
question in the next section.
III.
EPA's WATER QUALITY INITIATIVE
The relatively decentralized approach to water quality regula-
tion did not suit some interests. Environmental pressure groups
lobbied and brought suits to attempt to force EPA to take a more
aggressive national approach to water quality.66 Academic com-
63. Id. at 51. As Butler and Macey note, this rests on the assumption "that it is
moral for the federal government to force people to pay for goods that they do not
want." Id.
64. See David Schmidtz, When Preservationism Doesn't Preserve, 6 ENVIRONMEN-
TAL VALUES 327 (1997) (noting that treating endangered species as private property
may be the only means of preserving them).
65. See, e.g., MONT. CONST. ANN. ART. II § 3 (right to "clean and healthful envi-
ronment" in state constitution). The Gallatin River is in Montana.
66. See Houck, Long Road, supra note 8, at 10392-97 (describing campaign of
litigation to force EPA to act on TMDL provisions); see, e.g., Sierra Club v. Hankin-
son, 939 F. Supp. 865 (N.D. Ga. 1996); Idaho Sportmen's Coalition v. Browner, 951
F. Supp. 962 (W.D. Wash. 1996) (citizen suits seeking court orders to establish
TMDL schedules); see also Robert D. Mowrey, TMDL Implementation Issues and
Trends, 15 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T 112, 112 (2000) (citing "blizzard of litigation"
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mentators criticized EPA for not doing enough to address "the
broad range of chemical, physical, and biological insults to our
aquatic ecosystems." 67 Both sets of interests agreed that breath-
ing life into the TMDL provisions of the CWA provided the ap-
propriate vehicle for doing so.
Responding to these pressures on July 13, 2000, EPA issued
new regulations revising the Water Quality Planning and Man-
agement, or TMDL regulations and the NPDES and Water
Quality Standards. 68 EPA claimed that the reason for the new
rules was that, despite a quarter century of regulatory efforts,
"many waterbodies still fail to attain or maintain water quality
standards due to one or more pollutants. '69 EPA published its
proposed TMDL rules on August 23, 199970 and took public
comments for 150 days.71 Signaling the controversial nature of
EPA's proposed changes, EPA received "about 34,000" com-
ments on the proposed rules.72 After the comment period, EPA
significantly revised the proposal before issuing the final regula-
tions. This section briefly highlights the key aspects of those reg-
ulatory changes.
A. The New Regulations
The new TMDL regulations are built around the requirement
that states create a list of "impaired waterbodies," sorted accord-
ing to EPA's criteria into one of four categories.73
and "at least thirty-nine actions" in "at least twenty-nine states" as of fall 2000); Lisa
E. Roberts, Is the Gun Loaded This Time? EPA's Proposed Revisions to the Total
Maximum Daily Load Program, 6 ENVIRONMENTAL LAWYER 635, 647-53 (2000)
(describing litigation campaign)
67. Adler, Integrated Approaches, supra note 5, at 204.
68. Final TMDL Regulations, supra note 4, at 43,586. EPA's actions were contro-
versial, with Congress attempting to block the TMDL rule through an appropria-
tions rider. See Mowrey, supra note 6, at 113.
69. Final TMDL Regulations, supra note 4, at 43,587.
70. Proposed Revisions to the Water Quality and Management Regulation, 64
Fed. Reg. 46,012 (Aug. 23, 1999) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 130) [hereinafter
Proposed TMDL Regulations].
71. Final TMDL Regulations, supra note 4, at 43,589.
72. Id. at 43,589.
73. 40 C.F.R. § 130.27(a) (2001).
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" Part 1 waters are impaired by pollutants74 or which does not
"attain and maintain water quality standards. ' 75
" Part 2 waters are impaired by pollution76 that is not caused by
a pollutant;77
" Part 3 waters are those for which TMDLs have been com-
pleted, but water quality standards have not yet been at-
tained;78 and,
* Part 4 waters are expected to meet water quality standards by
the next listing cycle as a result of the use of other enforceable
pollution controls. 79
States are required to produce a "prioritized schedule" for estab-
lishing TMDLs for the waterbodies in category one; the TMDLs
for these waterways must be established within ten years.80 Each
state is required to articulate such methodologies according to
the rule's specifications, elicit public comment on the methodol-
ogy, and submit the methodology to EPA for review eight
months before it submits its actual list to EPA for approval.8'
74. "Pollutants" are defined as "Dredged spoil, solid waste, incinerator residue,
sewage, garbage, sewage sludge, munitions, chemical wastes, biological materials,
radioactive materials (except those regulated under the Atomic Energy Act of 1954,
as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2011), heat, wrecked or discarded equipment, rock, sand,
cellar dirt, and industrial, municipal, and agricultural waste discharged into water."
40 C.F.R. § 130.2(d). This definition largely parallels the Clean Water Act defini-
tion of "pollutant." Final TMDL Regulations, supra note 4, at 43,591. See 33 U.S.C.
§ 1362(6) (2001).
The distinction between pollution caused by pollutants and pollution not caused
by pollutants is a critical, if confusing, one. The former requires TMDLs while the
latter do not. EPA's example of the distinction is a comparison of a case where
"landscape actions that result in the introduction of sediment into a water body" and
the sediment "results in an alteration of the chemical, physical, or biological integ-
rity of the waterbody" with a case where an impairment is "caused solely by chan-
nelization of a stream's bottom." The first is pollution caused by a pollutant, the
second is not. Final TMDL Regulations, supra note 4, at 43,592. "EPA believes the
vast majority of impairments are caused by the introduction of pollutants and does
not anticipate large numbers of waterbodies to be identified as impaired only by
pollution." Id.
75. 40 C.F.R. § 130.20) (2001); 40 C.F.R. § 130.27(a)(i) (2001).
76. "Pollution" is defined in these regulations and in the Clean Water Act as "the
man-made or man-induced alteration of the chemical, physical, biological, and ra-
diological integrity of water." Id. § 130.2(c).
77. Id. § 130.27(a)(2).
78. Id. § 130.27(a)(3).
79. Id. § 130.27(a)(4).
80. Id. § 130.28(b)(2). A five year extension is possible where, despite expeditious
action, it is not "practicable" to establish the TMDL within ten years. Id.
§ 130.28(b)(2).
81. The rules specify detailed requirements for TMDL preparation and submis-
sion. These are:
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Once identified as impaired, waters remain listed until water
quality standards are achieved.8 2 EPA does not require TMDLs
for the Part Two waterbodies; the agency intended the listing "to
ensure they remain in the public's eye and are not simply ig-
nored. ' 83 Water bodies listed in Part Three but which do not
make substantial progress toward attainment of the WQS must
be moved to Part One and a new TMDL established. 84
The TMDLs must contain an implementation plan 5 much like
the State Implementation Plans (SIPs) in EPA's air program.8 6
States establish the maximum amount of each pollutant a water
body can receive while still attaining water quality standards and
determine the allowable contributions of each pollutant from
each contributing source in a watershed.87 The TMDL specifies
the maximum daily loads of each pollutant and the required re-
ductions from discharging sources necessary to meet WQS.
States submit these plans to EPA for approval.88
While EPA requires states to submit their methodology for
listing impaired waterbodies and a schedule for establishing
1. The rule also identifies the following eleven specific elements each TMDL must
include before it can be approved by EPA: Name and geographic location of the
impaired water body and upstream waterbodies that contribute significant
amounts of the pollutant;
2. Identification of the pollutant and the applicable water safety standard;
3. Quantification of the pollutant load that may be present in the waterbody and
still ensure attainment and maintenance of the WQS;
4. Quantification of the amount by which the pollutant must be reduced for the
water body to meet water quality standards;
5. Identification of the source or sources of the pollutant;
6. Determination of the amount of the pollutant that may come from point
sources;
7. Determination of the amount of the pollutant that may come from nonpoint
sources;
8. A margin of safety to account for uncertainties in setting the TMDL;
9. Consideration of seasonal variations and other factors that affect the relation-
ship between the relationship between pollutant loadings and water quality
impacts;
10. Allowance for future growth and reasonably foreseeable increases in pollutant
loads; and,
11. An implementation plan.
Id § 130.32(b)(1)-(11).
82. Id. § 130.29(b).
83. Final TMDL Regulations, supra note 4, at 43,592.
84. 40 C.F.R. § 130.27(a)(3) (2001).
85. Id.
86. See Morriss, The Politics of the Clean Air Act, supra note 1, at 270-76 (describ-
ing SIP process).
87. 40 C.F.R. § 130.32(b)(5)-(7) (2001).
88. Id. § 130.32(a).
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TMDLs for EPA review, it will not approve or disapprove the
methodology or schedule.8 9 Instead, the rule states that EPA will
comment on states' methodologies and schedules, and consider
them "in its review and approval or disapproval of [state] list and
priority rankings." 90 The absence of an approval mechanism is
illusory, however, as EPA will evaluate the states' responses to
EPA's comments - and warns in the final rule preamble that "[i]n
some cases the failure to address [EPA's] comments may result in
a disapproval or a partial disapproval of the state's list
submission." 9'
For EPA to approve the TMDL, the implementation plan must
meet EPA's specific criteria, which vary depending on whether
NPDES permits are required.92 For waterbodies impaired only
by point sources covered by NPDES permits, the plan must iden-
tify the facilities and the limits needed to bring those facilities
into compliance with the TMDL.93 Where the waterbody is im-
paired only by sources not subject to an NPDES permit, the
plans must include identification of source categories, descrip-
tions of regulatory or voluntary actions that will lead to imple-
mentation and a schedule.94 For waterbodies impaired by a
"blend" of these two categories of sources, plans must include all
elements required for either.95 All plans must also include a
schedule for implementation, a modeling and/or monitoring plan,
a description of interim measurable milestones and criteria used
to measure progress.96 The rule also emphasizes public participa-
tion and opportunity to comment on lists, priority rankings,
schedules and TMDLs prior to submission to EPA.97
The new rules also give EPA additional authority over NPDES
permits. For discharges to impaired water bodies in NPDES-au-
thorized states, EPA now has the authority to object to, and ulti-
mately reissue, expired and administratively-continued permits if
necessary to ensure progress toward meeting water quality stan-
dards and implementing TMDLs.98
89. Id. § 130.24(c).
90. Id.
91. Final TMDL Regulations, supra note 4, at 43,605.
92. 40 C.F.R. § 130.32(a) (2001).
93. Id. § 130.32(c)(i)
94. Id. § 130.32(c)(2).
95. Id. § 130.32(c)(3).
96. Id. § 130.32(c).
97. Id. § 130.36.
98. Id. § 123.44(k).
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B. Implications of the New Rules
Total Maximum Daffy Loads, an important concept in assuring
water quality, have not previously played a major role in water
quality regulations, which have focused more on NPDES con-
trols on point sources. The new rules make TMDLs the corner-
stone of federal water controls. The key innovation in the new
rules is that EPA changed what is considered to be a TMDL.
Previously, TMDLs were "principally a quantitative calculation
of the amount of pollution that a stream could receive and still
remain in compliance with standards." Now, EPA defines a
TMDL as "such a calculation plus a detailed 'implementation
plan' that is designed to contain waterbody-specific strategies for
reaching compliance within a specific time." 99 This shift in focus
from NPDES and point source controls to TiMDLs reflects the
fact that most point sources were already highly regulated and
that discharges that enter water from point sources are minimal
due to existing regulation.100 (Indeed, one of the major groups of
point sources that have failed to control point source discharges
is public sewage treatment plants.10 1) Further tightening of point
source controls would add substantial costs while providing little
improvement in water quality.1°2 Thus it is generally accepted
that for there to be significant improvements in water quality
around the nation, it makes little sense to tighten the standards
for point sources further. 0 3 Nonetheless, point source dis-
charges are enough of a concern that, as an EPA official put it,
"if nonpoint source tradeoffs are not available or the controls
developed as a result of a 'tradeoff' fail to achieve water quality
standards, the NPDES permit becomes the ultimate method of
achieving standards." 1°4
99. Mowrey, supra note 666, at 113.
100. See Boyd, supra note 28, at 8 ("Future improvements [in water quality] must
come principally from nonpoint source controls.")
101. See ADLER, supra note 22, at 14-16 (describing pollution from sewage treat-
ment plants).
102. See Thorme, supra note 28, at 92-93 ("[I]n most cases, additional point
source controls will result in only marginal water quality benefits since point sources
already controlled by technology-based limits often contribute substantially less pol-
lutants than nonpoint sources.)
103. See Boyd, supra note 28, at 8 ("Future improvements [in water quality] must
come principally from nonpoint source controls.")
104. Thorme, supra note 28, at 74 (quoting Geoffrey Grubbs, Director, EPA As-
sessment and Watershed Protector Division (August 13, 1992)). See also Boyd, supra
note 28, at 9, ("Absent nonpoint controls, point sources can reasonably expect to be
held responsible for load reductions on TMDL-impaired waterbodies.") Nonpoint
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Nonpoint sources, including agriculture, silviculture, and urban
run-off, are major sources of most remaining water pollution. 10 5
Thus, a focus on reducing effluent from unregulated nonpoint
sources is likely to be more cost-effective than further restrictions
on point sources. 10 6 Because nonpoint sources are, by definition,
hard to pinpoint, it makes little sense to talk about technological
controls on nonpoint sources.'0 7 Improving water quality there-
fore requires a focus on what ends up in water that causes harm.
In this sense, the basic thrust of the TMDL rule is logical. The
focus should be on what is in a particular body of water that may
harm humans or aquatic'life, not the specifics of exactly how
much is contributed from each source into each body of water.
As always, the devil lies in the details of implementation. The
essential problem with the TMDL rule is that it uses this logical
focus to grant the federal EPA nearly unlimited authority to ad-
dress anything that affects any body of water under a multitude
of standards and considerations that EPA may apply on a case-
by-case basis. This sweeping federal authority is particularly in-
appropriate considering the lack of knowledge of the extent of
sources are also "openly nervous about facing tangible abatement requirements."
Houck, Resurrection, supra note 9, at 10,330.
105. See Environmental Protection Agency & United States Department of Agri-
culture, CLEAR WATER AcrION PLAN: RESTORING AND PROTECTING AMERICA'S
WATERS 52 (1998) (noting that "polluted runoff is the greatest source of water qual-
ity problems in the United States today") and Houck, Long Road, supra note 8, at
10399 ("[n]onpoint source pollution has become the dominant water quality prob-
lem in the United States, dwarfing all other sources by volume and, in conventional
contaminants, by far the leading cause of nonattainment for rivers, lakes, and estua-
ries alike.")
106. Nonpoint source pollution is a significant amount of water pollution and
comparatively lightly regulated or not regulated at all. See David Zaring, Note, Agri-
culture, Nonpoint Source Pollution, and Regulatory Control" The Clean Water Act's
Bleak Present and Future, 20 HARV. ENV. L. REv. 515, 517 (1996). The marginal
benefits of introducing controls on nonpoint sources is thus likely to be large com-
pared to the marginal benefits of additional controls on comparatively heavily regu-
lated point sources.
107. Id. at 531. ("The EPA concluded that in the context of nonpoint source pol-
lution, site-specific decision-making that considers the nature of the affected water-
shed or waterbody, point sources, and management practices to be regulated are
more effective than uniform technical standards.") See also Daniel R. Mandelker,
Controlling Nonpoint Source Water Pollution: Can It Be Done?, 65 CHi.-KENT L.
REv. 479, 483-84 (1989) (noting that technology for nonpoint sources varies signifi-
cantly from site to site); RODGERS, supra note 6, at 306-308 (finding "controllability"
defines point sources); S. Rep. No. 370, 95' Cong. 1' sess., 37 (1977) reprinted in
1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4326, 4362 (identifying that "nonpoint source pollution from
animal wastes, fertilizers, pesticides, and eroded soil is difficult to control because of
the diffuse nature of the problem.")
TMDLS & WATER QUALITY
the problem the rule proposes to address and the local nature of
water quality issues.' 08
EPA is right, both economically and ecologically, to focus on
watershed management of water quality. However, water quality
is largely a local issue, as every water basin differs in its science
and uses. EPA should be concerned with water quality - what is
in the water that causes harm - but it should not be concerned
with the details, at the federal level, of pollution control efforts
for each body of water nationwide. Not only is this a virtually
impossible task, but it conflicts with the intent of Congress ex-
pressed in its requirement that each state have authority over its
own waterways.
We have three general concerns with EPA's rule:
1) The new rules do not respect the local nature of water bodies
and conflict with the goal of Congress that states should retain
primary responsibility for water quality control;
2) The rules are both prescriptive and open-ended, leaving states
little flexibility, but burdening them with substantial responsi-
bility; and
3) By creating an impossible task, the rule forces EPA to act in
an arbitrary manner, creating opportunities for rent seeking
and corruption.
1. Highly Specific National Controls Do Not Respect the
Local Nature of Water Bodies and Conflict with the
Goal of Congress
The prescriptive nature of the TMDL rule conflicts with the
objective of Congress in the Clean Water Act in giving states pri-
mary responsibility for water quality control. 0 9 Despite this stat-
108. Indeed, the TMDL process thus far is the result of litigation by political pres-
sure groups. As one commentator noted, the political-litigation plan, intended by at
least some of the pressure groups to force EPA to adopt their position on regulating
nonpoint source pollution, resulted in secret negotiations between EPA and the
pressure groups without the participation of "those stakeholders who will have to
build and pay for the new facilities necessary to comply with TMDL-driven permit
requirements." Hyde, supra note 28, at 16. This issue is discussed in the context of
the Tar-Pamlico example infra at notes 172-74 and associated text.
109. This intention is manifest throughout the CWA: "It is the policy of Congress
to recognize, preserve, and protect the primary responsibilities and rights of States
to prevent, reduce, and eliminate pollution ...." 33 U.S.C. § 1251(b) (2001). The
states are "to consult" with the Administrator of the EPA, as Congress supports
federal research and "technical services and financial aid to State and interstate
agencies and municipalities in connection with the prevention, reduction, and elimi-
nation of pollution." Id. Furthermore, the Clean Water Act states "It is the policy of
Congress that the authority of each state to allocate quantities of water within its
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utory recognition of the importance of state level approaches,
EPA's changes, define procedures and controls, and could im-
pose federal authority and priorities directly on states, rather
than allowing states to make decisions regarding local water bod-
ies based on their own unique characteristics. The emphasis in
the regulatory changes is on national consistency and uniformity,
when local approaches tailored to individual water bodies and
the preferences of the populations living near those water bodies
are much more likely to be effective. Commentators on EPA's
proposal recognized the problems created by the regulations'
centralization of authority.110
The regulatory changes authorize EPA to determine TMDLs
for all Part One waters in the nation, either through conditions it
imposes for approval of state plans or by taking over a state pro-
gram. In addition to asserting authority in these rules to require
any WQS for any water body, EPA leaves open the possibility
that in the future it might "promulgate federal water quality stan-
dards for states, pursuant to section 303(c)(2)(B), to ensure con-
sistent, nationwide application of the new requirements in the
period between listing and TMDL establishment.""' Thus,
states must submit water quality plans that meet EPA approval,
for achieving standards that may be determined by EPA at a
later date on a case-by-case basis.
States, in establishing TMDLs to meet water quality standards
for a given water body, must include every possible source that
might contribute to loadings of any pollutant. That is, the impact
on water from all possible sources must be determined by the
states for every body of water impaired by pollutants or un-
known sources, including: point sources of pollutants (discharges
from public and private sources such as water treatment plants);
nonpoint sources of pollutants (runoff from land, including that
from agriculture and silviculture activities, taking into account
jurisdiction shall not be superseded, abrogated or otherwise impaired by this chap-
ter. It is the further policy of Congress that nothing in this chapter shall be con-
strued to supersede or abrogate rights to quantities of water that have been
established by any State. Federal agencies shall co-operate with State and local
agencies to develop comprehensive solutions to prevent, reduce and eliminate pollu-
tion with programs for managing water resources." 33 U.S.C. § 1251(g).
110. As EPA noted in its statement justifying the final rule, "[m]any commenters
also perceived EPA's proposal as an attempt to supplant State, Territorial, or au-
thorized Tribal primacy." Final TMDL Regulations, supra note 4, at 43,590. EPA
denied that this was its intent. Id. Despite the denial, EPA did not significantly alter
the objectionable features of the proposed rules.
111. www.epa.gov/owow/tmdl/tmdlsfs.html.
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the impact of unusually heavy rains, the impact of unusually
large snow melts, and the impact of unusually dry weather); and
atmospheric pollutants (the impact of airborne dust and pollu-
tants deposited on bodies of water ).112
While it is true that all these things affect water quality, EPA
places no limits on what it may demand from the states in this
regard. Documenting all that EPA is proposing for every Part
One water body may well be technically impossible, as well as
economically infeasible. EPA admits that it knows little about
basic water quality for the majority of the nation's waters,113 yet
this rule requires states to provide detailed documentation re-
garding the current and potential water quality of every river,
stream, estuary, reservoir, lake and pond. Under this reading of
the regulation, we believe states would have to include estimates,
for example of what happens in case a hurricane should hit, a
drought should occur, or a large dust storm in New Mexico
should drop heavier than usual particulate matter on Arkansas.
Under its existing authority, EPA already claims broad author-
ity to force states to deal with water issues that may arise from
any source.114 In September 1999, for example, the Governor of
Nebraska attacked EPA's designation of a stretch of the Middle
Platte River as "impaired water" because of concerns about high
water temperature." 5 He pointed out that the water was warm
due to summer sun and low water levels." 6 The Governor recog-
nized that historically when the weather is hot and rainfall scarce,
the river temperature rises, just as EPA asserts. However, he
wondered: "How can the state control temperature pollution
coming from a natural source, like the sun?" 117 EPA will not
answer that question because it asserts that it is Nebraska's re-
112. This reflects a broad, and controversial, reading of the CWA. See Final
TMDL Regulations, supra note 4, at 43,594 (acknowledging that some commenta-
tors on proposed rule disagreed). EPA's insistence on including nonpoint sources,
including natural sources, atmospheric deposition, and sources not regulated under
the NPDES, will significantly restrict states' discretion.
113. See Final TMDL Regulations, supra note 4, at 43,587 (noting that EPA had
data on less than 25% of rivers and streams, less than 33% of estuary waterbodies,
and less than 50% of lakes, ponds, and reservoirs (not including the Great Lakes)
when it issued the final rules).
114. See, e.g., Boyd, supra note 28, at 9 (EPA "contends that the CWA provides it
with ample authority to step in and issue nonpoint controls if there is evidence of
ongoing impairments and inadequate state responses to them.").
115. Nancy Hicks, EPA Says Platte Too Hot; Johanns Fumes Over 'Sun Pollution'
OmAHA WORLD-H-RALD (Sept. 21, 1999) at 1, available at 1999 WL 4515605.
116. Id.
117. Id.
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sponsibility to resolve the problem." 8 Nebraska denies there is a
problem, other than one caused by nature. EPA demands a rem-
edy and under the new rules may impose one.
The real issue in this example is that of water flow restrictions
caused by the Kingsley Dam. Nebraska contends that the EPA
does not have the authority to order the dam torn down or to
require higher levels of water flow from the dam." 9 EPA does
not assert it has such authority, but continues to demand that
Nebraska lower the river water temperature by changing water
flow. In essence, EPA is using water quality standards for tem-
perature to force a state to change water flow practices, some-
thing it cannot directly regulate. The new rules would end any
doubt about the ability of EPA to force states to impose any con-
trol on any activity that now affect or in the future could affect
water quality, as defined by EPA. 2 0
EPA's new rules thus create an important new monopoly in
EPA on water quality. By asserting such broad authority over
water quality issues, EPA has ensured that all water quality (or
even all water-related issues) ultimately may be within EPA's
claimed authority. No water user may be secure in its use without
EPA's sanction, no state may broker a compromise among water
users without involving EPA.
EPA's monopoly on final authority has significant implications.
First, EPA's monopoly will lead to reduced entry into water-de-
pendent industries, reducing competition. Second, EPA's monop-
oly will offer the existing water users a tempting target for rent-
seeking behavior. By convincing EPA to act, existing users will
118. EPA declined to revise its proposed rule's definition of pollutant "load" to
exclude "increases in temperature due to solar input. EPA does not believe that the
source of a load should disqualify it from being a load. What needs to be done to
mitigate heat load from solar input will be addressed by a State, Territory, or author-
ized Tribe when it establishes the TMDL." Final TMDL Regulations, supra note 4,
at 43,594.
119. Indeed the Clean Water Act expressly states "It is the policy of Congress that
the authority of each State to allocate quantities of water within it jurisdiction shall
not be superseded, abrogated or otherwise impaired by this chapter." 33 U.S.C.
§ 1251(g) (2001). EPA acknowledged that low flow could not itself be considered a
pollutant, and so the basis for requiring a TMDL. See Final TMDL Regulations,
supra note 4, at 43,592-93. However EPA accomplished the same objective by re-
quiring that TMDLs consider seasonal variations defined broadly so that "water
quality standards are attained and maintained in all seasons and all flows." Id. at
43,624; see also 40 C.F.R. § 130.32(b)(9) (defining seasonal variations).
120. See, e.g., Boyd, supra note 28, at 10 ("TMDL rules will highlight the artificial
distinction between water quality and quantity issues.... TMDLs will in some cases
constrain water transfers involving impaired waterbodies.").
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enhance the value of their asset (the right to discharge) by mak-
ing it scarcer.
This effect of centralization is worsened by the failure of EPA
to base the new regulatory regime on sound science. While there
are real problems with water quality in various lakes, rivers and
estuaries, the EPA has little scientific evidence about the extent
of the problem.
Rational policy, based on evidence of problems, would de-
mand that the Agency collect comprehensive evidence, rather
than simply assert that a massive expansion of detailed regula-
tions are justified because, for example, to the best of the EPA's
knowledge, 1.5 percent of the rivers in the nation might violate
water quality standards in the future. 121 The fact that just over
one-third of the twenty-three percent of the nation's rivers sur-
veyed for the National Water Quality Inventory Report (or eight
percent of the nation's rivers and streams) are not in full compli-
ance with existing water quality standards is not buttressed by
evidence that deviations from existing EPA regulations are, in
fact, causing harm to the "chemical, physical and biological integ-
rity of the Nation's waters," as specified by Congress in the Clean
Water Act.122
EPA recognizes that it has little scientific evidence to support
the rules. "One option EPA considered was whether it would be
appropriate to revise the regulations to require that TMDLs be
established only on data and analyses which met very strict qual-
ity and analytical standards. EPA concluded that this approach is
121. "Of the 23 percent of the Nation's rivers and streams that have been as-
sessed, 35 percent of these do not fully support water quality standards or uses and
an additional 10 percent of these are threatened." Final TMDL Regulations, supra
note 4, at 43,587. That means that the water quality in only 2.3 percent of the na-
tion's rivers and streams are known to be "threatened."
What is a "threatened waterbody"? EPA defined it in the proposed rules that
currently attains water quality standards, but for which existing or readily available
data and information on adverse declining trends indicate that water quality stan-
dards will likely be exceeded by the time the next list of impaired or threatened
waterbodies is required to be submitted tQ EPA." Proposed TMDL Regulations,
supra note 70, at 46,047. In other words, so far as EPA can determine, as of its
National Water Quality Inventory Report to Congress for 1996, perhaps only 2.3
percent of the nation's rivers and streams appear to be threatened by an increase in
pollution in the future. See Final TMDL Regulations, supra note 4, at 43,587. EPA
is, apparently, unable to report anything on the water quality of the other 77 percent
of the nation's rivers and streams (or on 68 percent of the estuary waters, or 58
percent of the lakes, ponds, and reservoirs). EPA abandoned the requirement that
"threatened" waterbodies be included in the list in the final rule. See Final TMDL
Regulations, supra note 4, at 43,590.
122. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (2001).
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impractical and would significantly decrease the number of
TMDLs that could be established."'1 3 However, EPA does not
defend why it thinks it is better to have more TMDLs than to
have a few meaningful plans for truly impaired water bodies.
Critical observers argue that lack of monitoring has left states
unable to measure the quality of their waters or the progress
made. According to analyst Dr. Richard Halpern, for example,
twenty years after the Clean Water Act was passed, only "$33
million had been spent on monitoring the nation's water quality,
but taxpayers and the private sector had spent more than $540
billion on technology to fix our water, broken or not."'12 4 As two
USGS hydrologists concluded in 1993, "After all this time and
money, it would be desirable to know whether the [Clean Water]
act has worked. Is the water cleaner than it would otherwise have
been and have the environmental benefits, however they may be
counted, exceeded the costs?"'1 5 They concluded that decision-
makers "do not now have the information they need to make
wise decisions for the future.' 26
2. The Procedural Nature of the New Rule is Both
Prescriptive and Open-Ended
EPA's monopolization, and the ill-effects thereof, are wors-
ened by the prescriptive and open-ended nature of the new regu-
latory regime, leaving states with substantial responsibility but
little flexibility. The regulations require states to develop lists of
impaired water bodies, according to a specified format and using
EPA's prescribed priorities. States must also solicit public input
and document the methodology they use to develop the list of
123. Proposed TMDL Regulations, supra note 70, at 46,036.
124. Richard A. Halpern, Center for Global Food Issues, Where Have All the Nu-
trients Gone? Virginia's Livestock Agriculture and the Chesapeake Bay (1995), avail-
able at http://www.cgfi.com/newdetail.cfm?Art_ID=151 (last visited March 14,
2001).
125. Debra S. Knopman & Richard A. Smith, 20 Years of the Clean Water Act, 35
ENVIRONMENT 17, 17 (1993). Knopman and Smith are hydrologists with the U.S.
Geological Survey in Reston, Virginia.
126. Id. at 40. EPA is not entirely responsible for the paucity of scientific informa-
tion; Congress has never chosen to allocate significant funds for this purpose and,
similarly, most states do not consistently produce evidence about water quality. No
doubt this is because most streams are generally accepted not to be in environmental
distress. Presumably, the most attention is given to bodies of water that clearly suf-
fer from pollution problems.
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impaired water bodies and submit that to EPA eight months
before the list is due. 27
The ill-effects of the regulations can be seen in EPA's own
analysis of the requirement of "reasonable assurance" that a
TMDL will be effective. As EPA recognized, "many commenta-
tors [on the proposal] noted that States may have limited regula-
tory authority to address nonpoint sources, and perceived the
definition of reasonable assurance as forcing states to adopt reg-
ulatory controls on nonpoint sources rather than rely on volun-
tary programs."'12 EPA's definition of "reasonable assurance"
requires a TMDL for a source not covered by the NPDES per-
mits to satisfy a four-point test, including that the state is provid-
ing adequate funding.' 29 For EPA-established TMDLs, EPA may
establish adequate funding by conditioning other CWA grant
funds on the state providing funding.130 EPA is thus permitted to
establish "adequate" funding by threatening to withhold funds,
while states must establish it by actually providing funds.
An "approvable" TMDL must include considerations of water
quality, habitat, geomorphological, or other conditions that indi-
cate adequate water quality.' 31 For example, EPA described the
new rules in the proposal by noting that a state may have to
show, among other things, how it can improve spawning of a par-
ticular fish by twenty percent by its TMDL plan for a particular
water body.13Z Whether twenty percent more successful spawn-
ing is the "correct" target is at EPA's discretion. In planning such
TMDLs for various water bodies, the state must consider fine
sediment from hillsides or river banks, and the variability of such
sediment according to the season of the year, the amount of rain-
fall ("low flow during drought periods" and "high flow nonpoint
source runoff"), and the temperature that "varies as a result of
climate and season"' 33 and that may affect the impact on water
of assorted pollutants. 34 EPA recognized that such matters are
127. While EPA does not assert the authority to approve or disapprove the meth-
odology itself, it will consider methodology in its review and approval or disapproval
of state's list and priority rankings. Final TMDL Regulations, supra note 4, at
43,605.
128. lit at 43,598.
129. 40 C.F.R. § 130.2(p)(2) (2001).
130. Id § 130.2(p)(2)(i); see also Final TMDL Regulations, supra note 4, at
43,600.
131. 40 C.F.R. §130.33(a).
132. Proposed TMDL Regulations, supra note 70, at 46,031.
133. Id. at 46,031.
134. Id. at 46,031; see also 40 C.F.R. § 130.32 (2001).
2001/2002]
54 JOURNAL OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW [Vol. 20:25
"extremely difficult to solve" and may be "costly," so the Agency
assures the states that it appreciates the complexities they face. 135
However, EPA opted to read Congress's silence on the elements
of TMDLs to authorize it to "require such an implementation
plan as an element of an approvable TMDL.' 136 Moreover, EPA
argues that it has the authority to establish TMDLs even when it
has not disapproved a proposed TMDL and asserts that it should
"take the lead" in setting TMDLs for interstate or boundary
waters.137
While the general outlines of the new rules are based upon
water quality standards and implementation plans outlined by
Congress,138 EPA has significantly stretched the words of Con-
gress to give itself nearly unlimited control over state waters.
Whereas Congress says that water quality plans will take into ac-
count "seasonable variations," 139 EPA stretches that to be from
drought to flood conditions, as noted above. In other words,
states, in developing TMDLs, must consider the effect of "sea-
sonable variations," including hundred year floods and unusual
droughts1 4° Similarly, while Congress says that water controls
should be "stringent enough to assure protection and propaga-
tion of a balanced indigenous population of shellfish, fish, and
wildlife," 141 EPA stretches this to include habitat plans under the
Endangered Species Act' 42 and asserts that it has the option of
using the Safe Drinking Water Act standards or new standards
that may be developed in the future. 43
135. Proposed TMDL Regulations, supra note 70, at 46,031.
136. Id. at 46,032. EPA declined to place time limits on itself to act or to allow
states an appeal process from the disallowance of a TMDL. See Final TMDL Regu-
lations, supra note 4, at 43,632.
137. Final TMDL Regulations, supra note 4, at 43,633; see also 40 C.F.R. §§ 130-
135(b)(2) (2001).
138. See 33 U.S.C. § 1313 (2001).
139. Id. § 1313(d)(1)(C).
140. See 40 C.F.R. § 130.32(b)(9) (requiring consideration of seasonable varia-
tions "such that the allocations will result in attainment and maintenance of water
quality standards in all seasons of the year and during all flow conditions."); see also
Final TMDL Regulations, supra note 4, at 43,601 (declining to adopt definition of
seasonal variation to limit reach of this provision).
141. 33 U.S.C. § 1313(d)(1)(B).
142. The TMDL provisions were objected by "some commenters" (presumably
states) on the grounds that EPA was "attempting to shift the burden of compliance
with the Endangered Species Act away from EPA and to States." Final TMDL Reg-
ulations, supra note 4, at 43,628.
143. See id. 43591-92 (EPA interprets CWA to include "in most cases" drinking
water contaminants that are regulated under section 1412 of the Safe Drinking
Water Act); see also 40 C.F.R. § 130.33 (requiring consideration of ESA in TMDLs);
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The new rules grant EPA nearly unlimited authority to impose
controls on states. Although EPA's discussion of the rules sug-
gests that in practice the Agency does not intend to implement
such sweeping powers except in rare cases, EPA does not define
what these rare cases are and its powers are not limited by the
rules. EPA's power grab is all the more astonishing because of
the enormous costs it will impose on the states. Although EPA
claimed that the TMDL rules would not impose direct costs in
excess of $25 million per year, these figures are suspect. 144 A
1996 EPA report of the costs to state and local governments of
developing TMDLs (based on case studies of fourteen TMDLs)
provides some insights into potential costs to states, territories
and authorized tribes.145 It found that per-watershed costs
ranged from under $5,000 for small watersheds with single pollu-
tant source and no public participation to over $1,000,000 for
large watersheds with various sources and more extensive public
participation. The studies examined five components of costs:
administration, outreach and public participation, analysis, mod-
eling, and data collection and monitoring. If the additional re-
quirements in the rules increase administration and public
participation costs by twenty-five percent, and modeling and
analysis costs by fifteen percent (we assumed no increase in mon-
Final TMDL Regulations, supra note 4, at 43,628 (describing adoption of this
language).
144. EPA determined that the new rules were a "significant regulatory action"
under the terms of Executive Order 12866, and the preamble to the proposed rules
stated that EPA prepared an "Analysis of the Incremental Costs of Proposed Revi-
sions to the TMDL Program Regulations," which examines the direct costs to states,
territories and authorized tribes of developing TMDLs. Proposed TMDL Regula-
tions, supra note 70, at 46,042. However, the preamble does not report the results of
that analysis (other than to suggest in a separate section that these direct costs will
not exceed $25 million in any one year), nor does EPA post the analysis on its web
site. Interested public must go to EPA's docket to obtain it. The preamble also
promised expeditiously to gather information and provide analysis of the costs and
benefits of the implementation (by private parties) of the TMDLs required by the
rule and EPA hoped to make this available for public review and comment before
final promulgation of the TMDL rule.
Because EPA states that it does not expect the costs to states, territories and au-
thorized tribes to exceed $25 million in any one year, it has not conducted an analy-
sis as required by the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act ("UMRA") for rules
imposing costs on these governmental units or the private sector of $100 million or
more. Id. at 46,043. For rules costing more than $100 million in any one year,
UMRA requires agencies to consider, in a written statement, a reasonable number
of regulatory alternatives and adopt the least costly, most cost-effective or least bur-
densome alternative that meets the rules objectives.
145. EPA, TMDL DEVELOPMENT COST EsnMATEs: CASE STUDIES OF 14
TMDLs (EPA-R-96-001) (1996).
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itoring and data collection costs due to the changed rules), the
average incremental cost of the rule would be about $115,000 per
watershed. EPA suggests that over 20,000 waterbodies have
been identified as impaired or threatened, 146 implying total costs
of over $2 billion. Even if these costs are distributed evenly over
the fifteen-year period during which states must develop TMDLs
for all Part One waterbodies, it amounts to over $250 million per
year in costs to states, simply for developing plans.147 This rough
estimate does not include costs to private citizens of implement-
ing these plans. Other analyses also suggest that EPA substan-
tially underestimated the costs. 148
146. The Proposed Rules noted that the State of Kansas alone needs to produce
"TMDLs for over 1,000 waterbodies statewide" Proposed TMDL Regulations, supra
note 70, at 46,039.
147. The table below summarizes these rough calculations. The low and high esti-
mates for each cost component are from EPA's fourteen case studies, Figures 8a and
8b. The annualized cost estimates are calculated using a seven percent discount rate.
Cost Component Mean Cost/ Increment Total Cost/ Total Cost
watershed attributed Watershed for 20,000
In $1000 to rule in $1000 watersheds in
$1,000,000
Administration 50 25% $ 12.5 $ 250
Public 50 25% $ 12.5 $ 250
Participation
Modeling 400 15% $ 60 $ 1,200
Monitoring 300 0% $ - $ -
Analysis 200 15% $ 30 $ 600
1000 $ 115 $ 2,300
Annualized cost $ 253
over 15 years
148. The American Legislative Exchange Council ("ALEC") observes that states
estimated they will incur average costs of $50 million from the TMDL rule as pro-
posed. AimCEIAN LEGISLATIVE EXCHANGE COUNCIL, MODEL STATE LEGISLATION,
STATE IMPLEMENTATION OF CLEAN WATER Acr TMDL REQuIREMENTs (1999).
This amounts to almost $275 million per year. (This assumes the $50 million figure is
a present value, and that these costs are distributed evenly over 15 years, using a 7
percent discount rate.) Other studies of the costs of modeling watersheds (which is
not included in the $2 billion estimate) suggest that these costs also may be signifi-
cant. The General Accounting Office ("GAO") has estimated that current EPA wa-
tershed models, costing $25,000 per study, are insufficient to calculate the
consequences of pollutant loadings. GAO, WATER QUALITY: FEDERAL ROLE IN
ADDRESSING - AND CONTRIBUTING TO - NONPOINr SOURCE POLLUTrON (GAO/
RCED-99-45) 7-8, 46-49 (1999) (noting cost and that current methods have serious
methodological limitations). Better, but not well-tested, watershed models by the
U.S. Geological Survey are about $750,000 each, the same GAO report notes. Id.
One commentator observed, "conservatively estimating 100 watersheds per state,
the bill for their assessment alone could reach $4 billion." Oliver A. Houck, TMDLs
IV: The Final Frontier, 29 ENvTL. L. REP. 10469, 10476 (1997).
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Though based on very rough calculations, we believe the above
figures suggest that EPA's estimate that the changes will cost
under $25 million per year is understated. The cost of producing
comprehensive TMDLs, which must potentially account for tem-
perature swings, rainfall (and snow melt) highs and lows, habitat,
sedimentation, and a wide variety of pollutants and water quality
standards that EPA may rely upon in approving or setting such
plans, is clearly a massive undertaking, imposing costs that could
well exceed our rough $250 million estimate in any one year. The
states must incur these costs and, due to the open-ended nature
of the rule, are dependent on EPA's verdict as to whether a par-
ticular TDML is adequate with respect to the various elements
contained in the rule.
It is not clear how states will fund this open-ended program.
Indeed, the proposal noted that states "may have difficulty in
completely identifying funding sources for all such measures.' 49
Left unsaid is how funds are to be produced if not allocated by
state legislatures. EPA is putting itself in the position of forcing
the states to allocate additional funds to cover the costs of
whatever water protection programs EPA asserts it has the au-
thority to mandate on the states.150
EPA also asserted that the Regulatory Flexibility Act did not apply because the
Proposed Rules "will not have a significant economic impact on a substantial num-
ber of small entities." Proposed TMDL Regulations, supra note 70, at 46,041. EPA
did not claim that its rule would not involve compliance costs for small entities, but
rather claimed only that EPA was not directly ordering any group of small entities to
change their methods of operation. EPA asserted that "no impact flows directly
from these proposed regulations." Proposed TMDL Regulations, supra note 70, at
46,042. The impacts will flow from the states when they implement TMDL plans that
the states create under the Rules (or that EPA imposes if it disapproves state plans).
Similarly, EPA claimed that it did not have to comply with Executive Order
13045, which concerns health or safety risks to children, because the Proposed Rules
are not "economically significant" and do not "establish an environmental standard
intended to mitigate health or safety risks. Today's proposal is a procedural rule."
Proposed TMDL Regulations, supra note 70, at 46,045. Of course, the procedures
here specifically assert that the Agency may require states to incur or impose sub-
stantial economic costs. These costs will divert scarce state, territory, and tribal re-
sources away from programs that may provide much more effective and concrete
improvements in children's health and safety.
149. Proposed TMDL Regulations, supra note 70, at 46,034.
150. The American Legislative Exchange Council has responded with model leg-
islation to assist states in setting priorities to meet their obligations under the CWA
"in a fashion that recognizes their resource constraints and that is based on sound
scientific data." AmERIcAN LEGISLATIVE EXCHANGE COUNCIL, MODEL STATE LEG-
ISLATION, TOTAL MAXIMUM DAILY LOAD IMPLEMENTATION Act (1999).
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3. Creating Incentives for Rent-Seeking and Corruption
By allocating to itself the authority to review every TMDL
proposed by the states and by requiring that so many TMDLs be
issued so rapidly, EPA created an impossible task. Meaningful
review of the complex TMDLs cannot be achieved by EPA with
its limited resources, something EPA implicitly admitted in its
comments declining suggestions that proposed TMDLs pending
at EPA for a period without action be automatically approved. 151
Comparison with similar tasks under the Clean Air Act (review-
ing state implementation plans) 152 and Federal Insecticide, Fun-
gicide, and Rodenticide Act (reviewing state registration
decisions and reviewing pre-1972 pesticide registrations) 53
shows that EPA is unable to meaningfully review such a volume
of state decisions.
How will EPA allocate its scarce review resources? EPA will
face pressures from two groups to review particular decisions.
First, because the TMDL process creates what is essentially a
zero-sum game with respect to emissions into water, pollution
sources will have great incentives to use the TMDL-NPDES pro-
cess to foreclose existing and potential competitors' access to the
environment's waste disposal capacity. Second, environmental
pressure groups will be able to use the administrative process to
pressure EPA to review specific decisions and so to pressure spe-
cific sources to agree to their demands.154 Thus, in addition to
creating a cartel manager in EPA, the new water quality regula-
tory scheme also creates strong incentives for regulated indus-
tries to engage in rent-seeking behavior.
151. See Final TMDL Regulations, supra note 4, at 43,631 (acknowledging "con-
cems' about "the timeliness of EPA's TMDL approval actions").
152. See, e.g., Morriss, Clean Air Act, supra note 1, at 270-76 (detailing failure of
review of SIPs under CAA.)
153. See, e.g., Andrew P. Morriss, Pesticides and Environmental Federalism: An
Empirical and Quantitative Analysis of §24 (c) Registrations, in ENvIRo NmwrA
FEDERALISM 133, 144-45 (Terry L. Anderson & Peter J. Hill, eds. 1997) (describing
problems with EPA's review of pesticide registrations).
154. A similar process can be seen in the actions of pressure groups under the
Community Reinvestment Act to pressure banks. See Jonathan R. Macey & Geof-
frey P. Miller, The Community Reinvestment Act: An Economic Analysis, 79 VA. L.
REv. 291, 347 (1993); Keith N. Hylton & Vincent D. Rougeau, The Community
Reinvestment Act: Questionable Premises and Perverse Incentives, 18 ANN. REV.
BANKING L. 163, 187-90 (1999).
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IV.
PROPERTY RIGHTS AND THiE RULE OF LAW:
A SOLID FOUNDATION FOR WATER
QUALITY MANAGEMENT
EPA could recast the TMDL rules to more effectively meet the
congressional goals of significantly enhancing and protecting the
quality of the nation's waters, while respecting its objective re-
garding "the authority of each State"' 55 with respect to the use of
its waters. The needs of the states with respect to the uses of
their waters, and the causes of and solutions to water pollution
problems differ significantly from state to state.
Refocusing water quality regulation on outcomes instead of in-
puts (as reflected in the emphasis on TMDLs rather than
NPDES effluent limitations) is a major step in the right direction,
but greater flexibility is needed if the promise of real water qual-
ity improvements and cost savings is to be realized. Given a
choice between performance standards that identify and focus on
outcomes and technology-based input standards, common sense
suggests that environmental protection should be about the envi-
ronment and how it affects people, not about engineering and
permits. Performance or outcome-based water quality manage-
ment changes the incentives in the right direction. With uncon-
strained performance standards, polluters have complete
flexibility, technologically and economically, in finding effective
ways to meet environmental targets. New information and dis-
coveries can be translated quickly into enhanced environmental
quality. Profit seeking moves producers in the direction of im-
proved water quality. On the other hand, technology-based in-
put regulation tends to freeze technology, force a single approach
on polluters in the same industry, blunt the incentive to discover
and implement alternate approaches, reduce competition, and to
disregard outcomes. Permitted polluters who adopt approved
technologies can expand operations even though environmental
loadings may exceed the assimilative capacity of streams for han-
dling discharge. The fact that numerous river segments are envi-
ronmentally stressed while all dischargers meet EPA engineering
standards156 - and that this situation is destined to get worse - is
powerful evidence that input management will not generate envi-
ronmental protection.
155. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(g) (2001).
156. Proposed TMDL Regulations, supra note 70, at 46,016.
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The requirement that point-source dischargers who wish to ex-
pand first obtain offsets from existing dischargers raises the ad-
mirable prospect of gains from trade in the context of a river
basin management system.157 However, for EPA to require that
offsets of particular amounts and kinds be sought only after tech-
nology-based standards are met is just as clearly a step in the
wrong direction.
Evidence from experiments on Wisconsin's Fox River that of-
fered permit trading opportunities, the equivalent of market off-
sets, after EPA technology-based standards were met illustrates
the difficulties associated with a hybrid system that attempts to
install markets on top of command-and-control regulation.158
Touted in the early 1980s as a cost-effective alternative to strict
command-and-control regulation for reducing biological oxygen
demand (BOD), the Fox River experiment initiated by the Wis-
consin legislature in September 1981 offered the prospect of gen-
erating annual savings of $4.5 to $6.8 million. 59 But as
environmental economist Thomas Tietenberg points out, the
large savings were not achieved. 60 Only one trade between
BOD dischargers was recorded. The requirement that technol-
ogy standards had to be met prior to entering the market for off-
sets raised costs and practically eliminated the potential gain
from trade. In addition, bureaucratic barriers were then erected
by regulators who did not support the concept.' 6' In a perceptive
analysis of what happens when efforts are made to append mar-
kets to command-and-control regulation, two water quality man-
agement scholars pointed out early on that the Fox River
experiment would suffer because the financial and bureaucratic
incentives were not right.162 Their pessimistic forecast proved to
157. See ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, OFFICE OF WATER, MANAGING
NoNPoINT SOURCE POLLUTION (EPA 506/9-90) 195-96 (1992).
158. See Roger E. Meiners & Bruce Yandle, Clean Water Legislation: Reauthorize
or Repeal? in TAKING THE ENVIRONMENT SERIOUSLY 73, 97 n.13 (Roger E. Meiners
& Bruce Yandle, eds. 1993).
159. M. T. Maloney & Bruce Yandle, Building Markets for Tradable Pollution
Rights, in WATER RIGHTS 283, 312 (Terry L. Anderson, ed., 1983).
160. THOMAS TIETENBERG, ENVIRONMENTAL AND NATURAL RESOURCE Eco-
NOMICS 456 (1999).
161. Meiners, Reauthorize or Repeal, supra note 158, at 97.
162. Martin H. David & Erhard F. Joeres, Is a Viable Implementation of TDPs
Transferable? in BUYING A BETTER ENVIRONMENT 233, 234 (Erhard F. Joeres &
Martin H. David, eds., 1983) (University of Wisconsin Sea Grant Technical Report
No. 239, Land Economics Monograph No. 6).
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be extraordinarily accurate. EPA's TMNDL regulations are
flawed for the same reasons.
Water quality problems are inherently local or regional, and
while there is a national interest in improving environmental
quality, there are no national rivers or lakes. Even if there were
rivers and lakes that touched every state, or even most of them,
the span of such water bodies would be so large and heterogene-
ous that decentralized control would naturally emerge. To
achieve the largest net gains in water quality benefits, manage-
ment of water quality should be decentralized. Those best
equipped with specialized knowledge and with the greatest in-
centive to minimize cost and improve water quality should be
made responsible and accountable for managing water quality.
TMDL regulations should be refocused; they should be cast in
terms of property rights protection and the rule of law and fo-
cused at the state level. A decentralized approach for water
quality management based on the rule of law maintains state
supremacy and congressional intent that EPA "consult" with the
states.163
Instead of specifying in detailed fashion how states shall pro-
ceed in developing TMDLs for all bodies of water within their
boundaries and then engaging in continuous water quality plan-
ning and monitoring, federal rules for managing water quality
should simply require: 1) that each state have a plan for achiev-
ing water quality management that provides accountability and
liability for damages imposed on holders of environmental rights,
and 2) that real data on observed water quality conditions for all
major water bodies be provided continually and consistently to
the public. The data should be in a form that allows for compari-
sons to be made across time and space. Obviously, appropriate
definitions of "major water bodies" and "real data on observed
water quality conditions" would have to be specified.
The rule of law that has evolved through common law courts
provides a logical framework for defining legitimate holders of
environmental rights.164 Under common law, ordinary people
and communities of people hold the right not be harmed against
163. As EPA noted in the preamble to the final rule, "a common theme through
many comments was that the Agency should not attempt to force-fit clean up of
every impairment through the TMDL process." Final TMDL Regulations, supra
note 4, at 43,590.
164. See generally Roger E. Meiners & Bruce Yandle, Common Law and the Con-
ceit of Modem Environmental Policy, 7 GEORGE MASON L. REv. 923 (1999).
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their will. To illustrate, if a discharger of waste imposes costs on
parties downstream against their will, the holders of downstream
rights have a cause of action against the polluter. If those down-
stream are citizens of the same state or city populations in an-
other state, the cause of action is the same. State and federal
courts provide forums for settling the related disputes. Typically,
the remedies are damages and injunction.
If common law rights were enforced, any city that discharged
raw sewage that imposed costs on downstream citizens would do
so at its own risk. Paying a nominal fine to the EPA, which is the
usual result under the current regulatory system, does not get the
job done. For example, in 1997, the City of Atlanta was paying a
$20,000 per day fine to the state of Georgia for discharging un-
treated sewage directly into rivers and creeks in the Atlanta area.
The penalties were less costly than the cost of modernizing the
city's main sewage treatment works.165 Downstream communi-
ties had to wrestle with resulting drinking water contamination
problems, which were partly resolved by financial transfers pro-
vided by the state. At common law, a public nuisance suit could
theoretically be brought by a downstream community against the
City of Atlanta, asking for payment of damages and a cease and
desist order. Unlike statute-based remedies, which generate pen-
alty revenue to environmental protection agencies or into gen-
eral state coffers, common-law remedies generate payments to
the damaged party and can also bring injunctive relief. Similarly,
any nonpoint-source polluters who allowed runoff from a farm or
collection of city parking lots to impose damages on downstream
parties would be subject to suit. Any state that allowed damages
to befall the citizens of another state could be sued in federal
court. And any state that damaged the federal property of citi-
zens of the United States, as in the case of the Florida Ever-
glades166 or Yellowstone National Park, 67 could be sued by the
stewards of that property.
Common law property rights protection introduces an under-
standable discipline that causes ordinary people to become con-
165. See Charles Seabrook & Charmagne Helton, A Fine Mess: Sewage Runoff
Puts City Up the Creek, Again, ATLANTA CONST. (Mar. 19, 1997) at 1; See also Na-
tional Wildlife Federation, Send a Message to Atlanta City Officials Demanding Sew-
ers that Don't Infect Our Drinking Water, available at http://www/nwf.org/
chattahoochee/atlantasewercomments.html (last visited Mar. 14, 2001).
166. See CLAY LANDRY, PERC, UNPLUGGING THE EVERGLADES (2001).
167. See TERRY L. ANDERSON & DON LEAL, FREE MARKET ENVIRONMENTAL-
ISM 51-52 (2d ed. 2001) (describing environmental problems in Yellowstone).
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scious of and accountable to their neighbors. Common law
courts do not issue permits that allow polluters to harm other
people. Instead of dealing with the endless technical problems of
specifying TMDLs for hundreds of thousands of U.S. river seg-
ments, the common law process would protect environmental
rights. The result of that protection would then yield another
form of TMDLs, one based on the prevention of damages to peo-
ple and the things they value.
A. The Rule of Law Is Consistent with River Basin and
Watershed Management
From the very outset of the nation's interest in improving
water quality, scholars and policy analysts have focused on river
basins and watersheds as the appropriate domain for a substan-
tial part of water quality management. 168 Water quality results
from the collective action of all water quality users; it is impossi-
ble to achieve collective improvements by focusing on individual
discharge points. The European experience tells us about the
relative merits of river basin management. 169 Federal encourage-
ment for building environmental protection on the basis of prop-
erty rights and the rule of law would support the formation of
associations or multi-state compacts for improving water quality.
Building on a foundation of law and property rights leaves room
for many kinds of institutional experiments.
There are obvious economies associated with defining the
boundaries of a proposed solution so that they fit the boundaries
of the problem. A very positive U.S. experience is found in the
history of the Ohio River 10-state compact, ORSANCO, which
led to dramatic improvements in water quality in that region
before federal intervention. 170 A similar experience is seen now
in North Carolina's Tar-Pamlico River Basin Association, which
forms a cost-minimizing community of point-source and
nonpoint-source dischargers who are collectively improving
water quality of the Tar River and Pamlico Sound.' 7 '
168. See, e.g., J. H. DALs, POLLUTION, PROPERTY AND PRICES (1968); ALLEN V.
KNEESE AND BLAIR T. BOWER, MANAGING WATER QUALITY: ECONOMICS, TECH-
NOLOGY, AND INSTITUTIONS (1968).
169. David Riggs & Bruce Yandle, Environmental Quality, Biological Envelopes
and River Basin Markets for Water Quality in WATER MARKETING-TH NEXT
GENERATION 147, 152-54 (Terry L. Anderson & Peter . Hill, eds. 1997).
170. See EDWARD J. CLEARY, THE ORSANCO STORY (1967).
171. See Riggs, supra, note 169; NORTH CAROLINA DEPARTmENT OF HEALTH,
ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL REsoURCES, TAR-PAMLICO NSW IMLEMENTATION
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When ORSANCO was formed in 1948, there were no federal
water pollution control statutes. ORSANCO and state and local
statutes filled the need. By contrast, when Tar-Pamlico was
formed in the 1980s following a massive downstream fish kill,
federal statutes had failed to provide water quality protection.
Every point-source discharger in the watershed was operating
within permit limitations, and nonpoint source dischargers were
outside the regulatory control network.
Estimates of the incremental cost of reducing a unit of biologi-
cal oxygen demand (BOD) in the watershed region varied from
10 cents per kilogram to $3.15 per kilogram. 72 At one location
in the Tar-Pamlico estuary, reductions of harmful nutrient dis-
charge from an industrial point source ranged from $860 to
$7,861 per pound eliminated. It was estimated that the same pol-
lutant could be removed by farmers (nonpoint-source discharg-
ers) at a cost of $67 to $119 per pound. 73 In short, the expected
gains from trade were sizable.
Today, Tar-Pamlico collects revenues from point-source dis-
chargers who are members of the Association. The revenues
generated are used in turn to make low-cost purchases of reduc-
tions from nonpoint-source dischargers who are not association
members. The incentives are right for all parties. Operators of
publicly owned treatment works have coordinated capital im-
provements to minimize the cost of improving water quality and
have avoided the installation of more costly yet still ineffective
advanced control systems by paying discharge fees. Farmers in
the region gain revenues by modifying their cropping operations.
Meanwhile water quality has improved in the Tar River. Initial
estimates of the command-and-control approach to the problem
indicated the cost would be $50 to $100 million and water quality
would not necessarily be improved. By comparison, Tar-Pamlico
is achieving improvements at a cost of $11.7 million.174 Tar-Pam-
STRATEGY (February 13, 1992); U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, OF-
FICE OF WATER AND OFFICE OF POLICY, INCENTIVE ANALYSIS FOR CLEAN WATER
ACT REAUTHORIZATION: POINT SOURCENoNPOINT SOURCE DISCHARGE REDUC-
TIONS (Apr. 1992).
172. Bruce Yandle, Community Markets to Control Agricultural Nonpoint Source
Pollution in TAKING THE ENVIRONMENT SERIOUSLY 185, 193 (Roger E. Meiners &
Bruce Yandle, eds. 1993).
173. See Bruce Yandle, Community Markets to Control Agricultural Nonpoint
Source Pollution in TAKING THE ENVIRONMENT SERIOUSLY 185, 193 (Roger E.
Meiners & Bruce Yandle, eds. 1993).
174. David W. Riggs, Market Incentives for Water Quality in THE MARKET MEETS
THE ENVIRONMENT 167, 189 (Bruce Yandle, ed. 1999).
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lico and ORSANCO illustrate just two possibilities that states
might take in efforts to improve water quality.
The Tar-Palmico approach yielded a lower cost water quality
in a competitive context. Firms within the basin have a choice:
they can follow EPA's command-and-control dictates or join the
Association. The Association has an incentive to keep costs
down, while meeting or exceeding environmental goals. If EPA
were running the program, or approving the details of their oper-
ation, the competitive element would be lost.
Given a complete range of choices as to how to manage water
quality, it is conceivable that a river basin association would take
a TMDL approach precisely like the one outlined in EPA's rule.
It is also conceivable that an association would follow the path of
Tar-Pamlico, which, along with EPA approval, focuses strictly on
outcomes and supports contracting for reductions between point-
source and nonpoint-source dischargers. People in other states
would no doubt discover and implement a range of solutions to
the water quality problem that cannot be predicted before the
fact. Accountability and water quality protection would be as-
sured by a requirement of liability for damages provided by com-
mon law and with a reporting of water quality data required by
regulation.
B. EPA Should Be a Consultant to the States; Not a Manager
of TMDLs
The evolving state-centered water quality management process
still leaves a key role to be played by the EPA. It is not, however,
the micro-management role envisioned by the TMDL rules.
Quite apart from these rules, the EPA is positioned to be a key
consultant to the states in reporting water quality data, analyzing
conditions, and providing technical support in the development
of water quality management approaches. If water quality is to
be improved, it is critical that reliable data be provided so that
citizens and responsible officials can know where, when, and how
much progress is being made. If nothing else, the federal govern-
ment should provide accurate data on environmental quality.
EPA could play an enforcement role in common law suits that
involve interstate matters and protection of federally managed
assets. Obviously, the adjustment from enforcer of command-
and-control, technology-based standards to the role of consultant
in a common-law world will not come easily, but change is
important.
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V.
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Far more is known today about water quality management
than was known in 1972 when the current Clean Water Act was
passed into law. Even if the economic makeup of the country
had not changed, there would be reason to reexamine and per-
haps change the regulatory assumptions that supported that first
major statute. But the economy has changed dramatically. The
United States is no longer a smokestack economy: it is primarily
a services economy. The major water pollution control chal-
lenges have also changed. Instead of industry, it is now munici-
palities and nonpoint sources that continue to pollute. Instead of
just effluent discharge, it is also air emissions. The institutions of
the past do not fit the challenges of the present and future.
EPA's changes to its water quality planning and management
regulation may reflect an effort to shift from technology-based
controls determined at a federal level, to controls based on the
characteristics of individual watersheds. This is an important
transition, and a watershed approach to meeting water quality
goals is more conducive to a focus on outcomes, rather than in-
puts, which has dominated water quality management in the past.
However, EPA's prescriptive, procedural rule is likely to under-
mine the benefits of a watershed approach.
Centralizing decision making with EPA for hundreds of
thousands of river segments, lakes, and coastal zone regions com-
plicates and delays decision making about matters that are inher-
ently local. The regulatory framework proposed by EPA, with its
combination of command-and-control, technology-based regula-
tion with offsets and trading has not succeeded in meeting water
quality goals in the past and is not likely to succeed now.
River basins, watersheds, and coastal regions are natural units
for managing water quality. EPA's approach for TMDLs must
allow for and encourage the recognition of alternate geographic
governance units that minimize the environmental cost of achiev-
ing improvements in water quality.
A water quality management system based on the rule of law
and protection of environmental rights can be devised so that the
goals of TMDL can be achieved. The system must include ac-
countability and responsibility for actions that affect environ-
mental quality. The system must allow for flexibility in the
development of regulatory institutions and processes so that re-
gional differences in benefits and costs can be taken into account.
